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Corruption is considered as an essential element to explain a social phenomenon 
called ―resource curse‖ in recent studies. This explanation contains two-step casual 
relationships and it mentioned that there are plenty of literature have proved that 
corruptionhave negative effects on economic growth. However, controversies still exist 
on the relationship between natural resource and corruption. Existing researches have 
deficiency of analysis units or measurement method. Besides, there are rare empirical 
studies about the corruption of county- level governments in China.  
Shanxi province is the biggest coal production province in China and possesses rich 
coal resource. Its economy heavily depends on coal industry. In recent years its economy 
is suffering a dramatic decline, and its GDP growing speed is the lowest for two 
consecutive years. At the same time,its ―systematic corruption‖ attractedthe attention of 
media and the central government. Shanxi has some characters, such as ―many but small 
counties‖, resource dependence economy and sufficient personal information of corrupt 
official. These characters made it to be a perfect sample for the study of the relationship 
between natural resource and corruption. By theoretical analysis and case analysis, it is 
found that corruption in Shanxi is closely related with natural resource.   
This study choose 119 counties in Shanxi as samples to build a database of 
corruption index, which includes the information of corrupt officials’ tittle, experience, 
term of service, workplace. These indexes are to measure the corruption degree of 
officers in each county. Statistical results showed that the degree of natural resource 
abundance has significantly positive correlation with the degree of corruption of 
government officers. Officers’ corrupt behaviors are only impacted by absolute scale of 
natural resource rather than relative scale and per capital scale. It is found by analysis of 
the reasons why natural resource lead to corruption that some system factors provide soil 
for corruption, such as government monopoly in resource allocation, administrative 
intervention for resource enterprises, lack of judicial supervision, transaction of 
government official positions and collusion between government and businessmen.  
These results suggested that measurement of coral system management reformation 














and market resource allocation reformation. But it needs combine with the reformation of 
the judicial system and the appointment system of officials.  
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（Wheeler,1984）。随后，自 1993 年 Auty 提出“资源诅咒”（resource curse）概
念以来(Auty,1993)，丰裕的自然资源与经济发展之间的关系就成为争论的热点。
                                                 
①  杨佳，“山西腐败到底有多严重？”省委书记王儒林告诉你，http://guoqing.china.com.cn/2015-
03/07/content_34982434.htm，2015-03-07. 
















Sachs 和 Warner 的研究利用 1970-1989 的截面数据证实，即使在控制了初始人均收
入、贸易政策、政府效率和投资率等影响经济增长的多种因素之后，自然资源的丰
裕度与经济增长速度之间仍然存在显著的负相关（Sachs and Warner，1995）。
Sachs 和 Warner 的研究激发了大量的研究验证和解释―资源丰裕度与经济增长关系‖
问题，大部分研究都得出了与 Sachs 和 Warner 一致的结论，―资源诅咒‖现象得到










































































































Warner所做的工作（Sachs and Warner 1995,1997a,b,c,1999a,b,2001)。之后的研究在
不同的国家和地区之间，更长的时期上都证实了这一结果，一度发展成“典型事实”
（Auty and Mikesell, 1998; Sachs and Warner, 1999a）。 
  “资源诅咒”这个概念最早由 Auty 提出，但是一些资源丰裕的发展中国家经
济发展速度低于资源相对匮乏地区的现象早就引起了学界的关注。20 世纪 50 年代，
就有学者就此问题作了观察，并提出了相应的解释(Prebisch, 1950；Nurkse,1958 ；
Hirschman, 1958)。20 世纪 80 年代以后，这一关系也被大量的案例研究（Gelb，
1988；Auty ，1990, 1991, 1993, 1994a,b）和一些最初的截面数据研究所验证
（Wheeler ，1984；Auty and Evans ，1994)。 
  关于资源诅咒的解释大致可以归结为四类： 
1.结构主义与“荷兰病” 

























额减少，从而减缓经济发展（Gylfason, 2001a）。无论是实证研究（Leite and 




Warner, 2001）、减少储蓄和固定资产投资（Gylfason, 2001a; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 
2007）、降低人力资本和教育投入(Gylfason, 2001b; Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio, 
2007)等。 
2.制度与政策 







中去，从而实现更快的经济增长。Lane 和 Tornell (1996)也认为现有的制度质量决
定了自然资源是“诅咒”还是“祝福”。 
  资源禀赋影响制度环境的可能性得到了基于制度内生性理论提出得解释的支持，
其中政府体制类型和政策质量是最主要的制度环境（Auty, 2001a,b; Ross, 2001; 








































可能在之前的研究中也曾被提及，Sachs 和 Warner (1995)曾指出过去存在的资源拖
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